Introduction
Innovation occurs within a complex web of law. Of the myriad legal doctrines that affect innovation, the most directly relevant is intellectual property, particularly patent law. The United States Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, states a strong public policy goal for the granting of patents (and copyrights) to Moreover, von Hippel (2005) and Strandburg (2008) have demonstrated that user innovators, especially individuals, tend to be poorly served, and often harmed, by the patent system. Office ("USPTO"), patents claiming this class of biotechnological inventions have proved increasingly difficult successfully to assert in court (Torrance 2008 (Torrance , 2009 (Torrance , 2010a (Torrance , 2013 . It is too early to know precisely how the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and the courts will interpret Section 33.
Nevertheless, a rich body of judicial decisions on the validity, enforcement, and infringement of patents claiming human genes, human embryonic stem cells ("hESCs"), chemicals produced by human physiology, and human thought (especially relating to diagnosis and therapy) do provide valuable insight into how far Section 33 may reach. These decisions suggest that inventions related to the human body and its functions represent a lacuna in patentable subject matter. If interpreted in a manner consistent with this body of court decisions, Section 33 may represent an apotheosis of the marked common law trend against the patenting of inventions relating to the humans, the human body, and human bodily processes. No significant change in overall innovation rate is yet another possible outcome.
Such a result might align with earlier empirical comparison of innovation rates across countries with and without patent systems, in innovation rates were observed to have remained relatively stable with or without patent protection, while protection by trade secrecy rose markedly in systems without patents (Moser 2005) . Regardless of which of these patterns is observed, the legal change heralded by Section 33 provides a rare and valuable insight into how to craft patent policy that successfully promotes innovation. This chapter introduces the broad contours of the U.S. patent system, including some of the major reforms made to patent law by the AIA. It discusses the unease with which the law of property and intellectual property apply to human beings. Next, it explores the reluctances courts have shown towards the patentability of inventions directed to human beings: specifically, human genes, hESCs, chemical products of human physiological processes, and human thought (especially methods of diagnosis and treatment). The chapter concludes by suggesting that Section 33 offers a rare opportunity to observe a natural 7 experiment in which innovation may operate unconstrained by patents, and that the results of this experiment may provide a model for future reform of the patent system to the benefit of innovation, especially open and user innovation.
The Patent System
The U.S. patent system differs in a number of respects from the patent systems that predominate in other countries. The current system rewards the first person to invent with a patent, rather than the first person to file a patent application. In addition, the U.S. patent system is more likely to consider personal, noncommercial, educational, and research uses to be infringing than would many other countries.
Patent Requirements
To qualify for a patent, an invention must meet several legal requirements set out in the Patent Act. An invention must fall within acceptable categories of subject matter, be useful, new (both literally new and nonobvious), and adequately described in a patent application. Furthermore, the metes and bounds of any aspects of the invention its inventor wishes to protect must be carefully defined in the stylized form of patent claims. If a patent applicant can demonstrate to the USPTO that her patent application satisfies all of these requirements, in addition 8 to a number of formalities, the USPTO will issue a patent whose claims describe the monopoly rights to exclude others conferred on the patent owner.
Patentable Subject Matter
Section 101 of the Patent Act enumerates several categories of inventions eligible for patent protection. These are "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof". In 1980, when the United States Supreme Court decided the patent case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, it famously ratified a Congressional Committee Report that had interpreted Section 101 as including "anything under the sun that is made by man." Nonetheless, the Court was careful to highlight the unpatentability of "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." In interpreting these exceptions to patentable subject matter, the courts have only limited the patenteligibility of a small number of other categories of inventions. One class of technology to which courts have paid particular attention involves inventions that implicate a human organism, human body, or substituents body parts or processes; courts have tended to place these inventions towards the unpatentable end of the patentability spectrum. Section 33 is likely to reinforce the unpatentability of such inventions.
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The Right to Exclude Others
Once a patent has been issued by the USPTO, Section 271 of the Patent Act allows a patent owner to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing any inventions it claims. This negative monopoly right to exclude others can be powerful because it is based on the legal theory of strict liability. Under strict liability, knowledge and intent tend to be relatively unimportant compared to occurrence of an infringing act. Even independent invention tends not to be a defense to patent infringement. Consequently, a patent owner may successfully sue anyone who infringes a patent claim, whether or not such infringement is knowing, unknowing, deliberate, accidental, commercial, The AIA includes many changes to U.S. patent law, some of which will help to harmonize American patent law with practice in the rest of the world.
Some of these changes may even benefit user innovators. Under amended Section 102 of the patent statutes, there is a new first-inventor-to-file rule to encourage inventors to file patent applications as soon as inventions are completed, as only the first inventor who files a patent application claiming an invention will be eligible for a patent. Section 102 also institutes a new absolute novelty standard under which an inventor risks complete loss of patent rights if any third party 12 discloses the inventor's invention prior to the filing of a patent application. One beneficial implication of this reform may be to place detailed information about new inventions into the possession of the public earlier, which could encourage follow-on innovation.
Another substantial change to current patent law involves the creation of a post-grant review procedure (Sections 321-330), a new and potentially powerful means for challenging the validity of newly-granted patents. Like the patent opposition system already in place in Europe, post-grant review will create a formal administrative proceeding in the USPTO that anyone may use to challenge patents. Post-grant review will be much more rapid and less expensive than litigation in court. In addition, new Section 273 offers a defense to patent infringement for commercial use of a patented invention that began prior to the filing of a patent application or public disclosure by the patent owner. As discussed above, the new patent reforms also include a notable subject matter exclusion in biotechnology in the form of Section 33.
Each of these amendments will affect user innovators. Although the actual effects of these provisions may not be understood until courts begin to interpret the AIA, user innovation should benefit from the early elimination of poor quality patents, acceleration in patent application filings (and concomitant acceleration in patent expirations), availability of a prior commercial use defense, and creation of a patent-safe harbor for certain types of biotechnology.
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Patents on Human Beings
The possibility that a patent could claim a human being, either in whole or in part, is repugnant to many people. There exists a widely shared opinion that humans must not be treated as property -even intellectual property -under the law.
Patents that claim mere parts of a human, such as genes, may inspire "the visceral fear of corporate interests claiming ownership over our very bodies" (Crease and 
Humans as Property
Anglo-American law forbids the ownership of human beings or their bodies. Just as people cannot constitute property according to the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the common law has long prohibited human bodies from constituting property (Madoff 2009 ). Markets in human body parts have also tended to be illegal, whether those body parts derived from living human beings (Rao 2007) or dead human bodies (Goodwin 2006) . Similarly, intellectual property protection for inventions that encompass aspects of humans and their bodies is difficult to obtain, and even more difficult to enforce in court.
Experimentation involving human beings has profound ethical and moral implications for most people. Patent law provides only one set of legal constraints on such activity: the ability to exclude others from practicing a claimed invention.
Criminal, health, tort, family, and abortion law all offer more direct and robust regulation of the uses and abuses of humans at various developmental stages.
Thus, despite Congress' legislative action on the issue of patentability, other areas of law, morality, and ethics are likely to play more decisive roles in regulating human-related inventions.
Humans as Intellectual Property
Many inventions incorporate human participation, or involve substituent parts of humans, such as genes, proteins, cells, tissues, or organs. Some patents, such as 
Patents Directed to or Encompassing Human Beings
Patents on four categories of human-related biotechnological inventions have attracted considerable attention in the courts: human genes, hESCs, chemical products of in vivo conversion, and methods involving elements of human thought. Each of these categories fits comfortably within the codified provisions of the pre-AIA patent statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, lower courts, the federal executive branch of government, and Congress have all contributed to a trend whose direction has been the increasing curtailment of patent rights covering human-related inventions.
Patents Claiming Human Genes
According to Fiona Murray and Kyle Jensen (2005) human genomic DNA, though it also suggested that at least some synthetic DNA remained patent-eligible subject matter.
Human Embryonic Stem Cells
In 1998, the University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") filed the first in a series of patent applications claiming hESCs, methods of producing them, and their various uses in therapeutic and other applications (Rimmer 2008) . These patent applications were based on foundational research by Dr. James Thomson and his research group that took place at the University of The WARF patents were licensed to Geron Corporation, a biotechnology firm specializing in the development of regenerative medicine products and therapeutic methods. Opponents of patents claiming hESCs, including the Public Patent Foundation, challenged the WARF patents using a USPTO procedure called a reexamination. In the first round of reexaminations, three major WARF patents were found to be invalid. To salvage these patents, WARF was forced to amend and narrow the coverage of these patents' claims. These amendments marked a retreat away from claiming later stages of embryonic development (e.g., "post-implantation embryonic germ cells") and towards claiming much earlierstage cells (e.g., derived from a "pre-implantation embryo" or "human blastocyst") and "in vitro cell cultures" not derived from human embryos. In effect, these amendments distanced the patent claims from human embryos per se or even later stages of embryonic development. After additional rounds of reexamination, resulting in more amendments that further narrowed the scopes of the claims, the surviving patents emerged from reexamination without claims that could cover totipotent hESCs capable of producing a human being. Given the ethical controversies surrounding hESCs, it is likely that these WARF patents, and other patents claiming hESCs, will continue to face patentability challenges to 22 the extent that their claims implicate human beings or methods of producing them.
European patent law has tended to limit patents on hESCs more explicitly than U.S. patent law. For example, the same WARF patents whose claims have been substantially narrowed in reexamination in the USPTO have been found 
Chemical Products of Human Physiology
The human body routinely converts ingested or injected chemicals into different (4) recognizes an exception for "products," drugs whose therapeutic effects are produced through in vivo conversion have fared poorly under European patent law, just as they have under U.S. patent law.
Human Thought
Although lacking the obvious physical embodiment possessed by a human gene, hESC, or metabolite, human thought is still a product of the human body, 33 to cover. The phrase "directed to or encompassing a human organism" is vague on its face, and, although some of the words it contains are suggestive of language sometimes employed among patent attorneys, even this usage usually depends upon specific context to choose between alternative interpretations. Patent attorneys sometimes use the phrase "directed to" to indicate the core of a claimed invention, so "directed to … a human organism" could suggest that a claimed invention is essentially a human being per se. On the other hand, "directed to" could be interpreted to refer to an invention having a close connection to a human organism; human genes, hESCs, products of in vivo conversion, or thoughts might satisfy this criterion. The word "encompassing" is similar in meaning to "open transition phrases," such as "comprising" or "including," that link the introductory phrase of a claim with the specific elements recited by the claim. In this sense, its meaning implies that an invention would include an element (in this case, "a human organism") without excluding other elements from the invention. Under this interpretation, "encompassing a human organism" could mean any invention that includes, as one of its constituent elements, a human; here, methods of in vivo conversion or inventions including mental steps, such as methods of diagnosis or treatment of a human, might satisfy this interpretation. Without interpretive legislative history, the meaning of Section 33 will have to found elsewhere in the law. 
A Natural Experiment on Innovation without Patents
Section 33 now offers a valuable opportunity to observe a natural experiment on how innovation behaves when patent protection is formally removed. 
Human-Related Inventions as a Charter Technology
A patent-safe harbor may play a role in innovation analogous to the role that has been proposed for "charter cities." Paul Romer (2010) has suggested that special reform zones, called charter cities, might serve salutary purposes, such as fostering good governance practices, ensuring liberty for citizens, and encouraging economic prosperity. His proposal imagines that any country wishing to improve its governance and economy could set aside vacant land large enough for a city, import, establish, and enforce a set of rules already proven to promote good governance, and then invite any people who agree to abide by these rules to immigrate voluntarily. By supporting trustworthy laws and prosperity-supporting institutions in one geographically-circumscribed region of country otherwise plagued by untrustworthy laws and failing institutions, a charter city would allow its host country to run an experiment that compared new and old -and, perhaps, good and poor -governance. If the charter city produced desirable results, it could then provide a model for how to reform the laws and institutions of its host country. On the other hand, if the charter city were to underperform, or perform no better than, its host country, this result would also be useful in avoiding undesirable or detrimental reforms. 
